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NOTES & COMMENTS

Acknowledging the Hypocrisy: Granting Minors the
Right to Choose Their Medical Treatment

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, minors have been considered dependents of
their parents and who do not have any legal rights.' Specifically, they
are dependent on their parents until they reach the age of majority. As
such, a minor is legally unable to provide or withhold consent to
medical procedures. That legal incapacity to give informed consent
has resulted in numerous cases where a minor has been subjected to
medical treatment that was against his or her wishes or was unable to
obtain treatment that a parent has chosen to withhold.
Legislatures and courts have carved out exceptions to this rule
during the past century. For example, a minor may obtain adult legal
status, despite his or her age, through the statutory process of
emancipation. 4 Once emancipated, the minor is bestowed with both
the rights and responsibilities of adulthood.5 The United States
Supreme Court created another exception by extending the
fundamental right of privacy and bodily integrity to minors with
respect to terminating a pregnancy 6 and obtaining contraception. 7 In
I See Susan D. Hawkins, Note, Protecting the Rights and Interests of
Competent Minors In Litigated Medical Treatment Disputes, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2075,
2076 (1996) (surveying the history of children's legal rights); see also Jay C. Laubscher,
Note, A Minor of 'Sufficient Age and Understanding' Should Have the Right to Petition
for the Termination of the ParentalRelationship,40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 565, 568 (1996)
(discussing the common law background and constitutional rights of minors).
2 See Hawkins, supra note 1, at 2079-80.
3 See infra notes 148-151 and accompanying text.
4 See infra Part III.A.
5 See generally Laubscher, supra note 1, at 577-80.
6 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) [hereinafter
Danforth].
See Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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the state law context, many states have enacted statutes that allow
minors to obtain treatment for sexually transmitted diseases and
alcohol and substance abuse, regardless of age, without parental
knowledge or consent. 8 A few states have completely eliminated the
parental consent requirement for medical treatment and now allow9 a
"mature minor" to make his or her own medical treatment decisions.
Part I of this note discusses the traditional legal status of
children and the impact of parental and state interests, rooted in
constitutional law, on that status.' 0 Part II examines the common law,
legislative, and court created exceptions to the traditional legal
disabilities of minors.ll The legal requirement for informed consent
prior to receiving medical treatment and an adolescent's ability to give
informed consent are discussed in Part III. 12 Part IV discusses the
process that physicians should undertake in allowing their adolescent
patients to participate in deciding their medical treatment. 13 Also
considered are alternatives to litigation for resolving any conflicts that
arise and, if and when courts are involved in the dispute, the proper
role of judges. 14 The facts above support the proposition that the
current exception to traditional dependency doctrine is inconsistent
with the best interests of the minor. Specifically, the exceptions
undermine the minor's interests because they create a paradox that
denies mature minors, capable of making responsible decisions, the
legal ability to make medical decisions, 15 but grants immature minors

8 See Janine P. Felsman, Note, Eliminating Parental Consent and Notification
for Adolescent HIV Testing: A Legitimate Statutory Response to the AIDS Epidemic, 5
J.L. & POL'Y 339, 353-54 (1996).
9See Nancy Batterman, Under Age: A Minor's Right to Consent
to Health

Care, 10 TOURo L. REV. 637, 641 (1994).
10 See infra notes 17-56 and accompanying text.
11See infra notes 59-147 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 148-189 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 192-227 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 228-243 and accompanying text.
15 For example,

requiring parental consent for withholding medical

treatment. See infra notes 167-171.
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16
the ability to make critical life decisions.

I. THE LEGAL STATUS OF CHILDREN

Throughout most of United States history, children were
regarded as chattel, lacking any legal rights. 17 The law focused
instead on the rights of parents with respect to their children. 8 Since
minor children was completely dependent on their parents, they were
under a legal disability. I This legal disability precluded minors from
establishing their own domicile, from entering into binding contracts,
from consenting to any type of medical, dental, or psychiatric
treatment, from bringing a civil action, from making a will, and from
conveying real property. The view21that children are more than mere
property is a relatively new concept.
The Industrial Revolution marked the beginning of a shift in
society's perception of children. 22 Child labor laws and compulsory
education laws were enacted as a way to protect children from the
effects of industrialization. 23 However, despite these progressions, the
common law continued to regard minors as mentally incompetent, and
16 For example, allowing a minor to terminate her pregnancy without
parental consent. See infra Part II.B.
17
See Hawkins, supra note 1, at 2076.
18 Id
19 See Laubscher, supra note 1, at 568.
20 Id. at 568-69 (listing these and other traditional legal disabilities of
children).

21 See Lynne Marie Kohm & Maria E. Lawrence, Sex at Six: The

Victimization of Innocence and Other Concerns Over Children's "Rights," 36 BRANDEIS
J. FAM. L. 361, 369 (1997-98) (describing the historical background on the law and
society's perception of childhood).
22 See Hawkins, supra note 1, at 2076.
23 Id.

See also DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE:

THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 205-12 (1980)

(discussing the influence of the progressives on the adoption of child welfare
measures including labor and education laws).
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thus applied a legal presumption of incapacity. 24
The presumption of incapacity was prevalent in both civil and
criminal law. 25 For instance, a minor could not be held liable for an
intentional tort, because it was presumed that he or she was unable to
formulate the requisite intent.
Criminal law presumed that young
children were unable to formulate the necessary mens27if,
rea element of a
crime and therefore, could not be held culpable.
These
beliefs
28
continued basically unchanged until the Twentieth Century.
During the second half of the Twentieth Century, many courts
and legislatures altered or removed some of the traditional legal
disabilities placed on minors. 29 For example, both tax and criminal
law, have "recognized that children under the age of eighteen should
sometimes be treated as adults." 30 The United States Supreme Court's
declaration that "constitutional rights do not mature and come into
being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority," 1 ushered in a new era in children's legal rights.
Despite this expansion of children's legal rights, a minor still
needs the express or implied consent of his or her parents or guardians
in order to receive medical treatment. 32 The notion that children do
24 See generally Jennifer Fouts Skeels, In Re E.G.: The Right
of Mature

Minors In Illinois to Refuse Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 21 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1199,
1209 (1990) (explaining the presumption of incapacity with respect to minors).
25 Id.
26 Id; see, e.g., Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 745 (Tenn. 1987).
27 See generally Fouts Skeels, supra note 24, at 1209; see also WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W.

SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1986).

The criminal law

follows the "Rule of Sevens" for determining capacity of minors to form the required
mens rea. Id.
28 See Hawkins, supra note 1, at 2076.
29 See Laubscher, supra note 1, at 569 (discussing the changes in the law
relative to children).
30
Id.
31 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (recognizing
that minors possess constitutional rights). See also discussion infra notes 79-90 and
accompanying text.
32 See Felsman, supra note 8, at 347-48 (describing the common law
requirement of parental consent and notification).

2000] ACKNOWLEDGING

THE HYPOCRISY

903

not have the cognitive capacity, experience, and maturity necessary to
make complicated life-choices continues to permeate this area of the
law. 33 In addition, there is a belief that parents, in consultation with
the child's physician, will make the correct
treatment decision;
34
treatment that is in the child's best interest.
A. The Parents'Interest
The presumption that parents will act in the best interest of
their children is rooted in our constitutional law. 35 In Pierce v.
Society of Sisters36 and Prince v. Massachusetts,37 the United States
Supreme Court recognized that a fundamental right, embodied in the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is the parents'
"liberty interest in the custody and management of their children,
[and] a corresponding duty to provide care." 38 Furthermore, in Meyer
v. Nebraska the Supreme Court held that parents have an implicit
constitutional right to freedom from state intervention in family
matters. 39 The basis for the Meyer Court's decision rested on
Id. at 347-48; see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634
(1979).
See Richard E. Redding, Children's Competence to
Provide Informed
Consent for Mental Health Treatment, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 695, 697-98 (1993)
(arguing that the assumption that parents always act in the child's best interest is invalid).
See Elizabeth J. Sher, Note, Choosingfor Children:Adjudicating
Medical
Care Disputes Between Parentand the State, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 171-72 (1983).
36 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that a state law mandating parents to send
their children to public schools interfered with the parents' liberty to control their
children's education).
321 U.S. 158 (1944) (recognizing that religious freedom and parental
autonomy are important, but not without limitation and thus, holding that the state, as
parenspatriae,could restrict parental control by prohibiting child labor).
38 See Isabel Traugott & Ann Alpers, In Their Own Hands: Adolescent's
Refusal of Medical Treatment, 151 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MEDICINE
922, 923-24 (1997) (discussing the presumption of parental decision making); see also
Sher, supra note 35, at 170-72 (explaining the basis for parental autonomy in child
rearing).
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (invalidating a Nebraska law, enacted
during
World War I when anti-German feelings were strong, which banned the teaching of
foreign languages in public schools).
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society's acceptance of the premise that parents should be able to
make choices for their child, without state
intrusion, and that parents
40
typically act in their child's best interests.
This deference to parental authority is driven by two
presumptions. First, courts believe that "parents, possess what a child
lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for
making life's difficult decisions." 4 1 Second, lawmakers presume that
the "natural bonds of affection" cause parents to act in their child's
best interests. 4 2 Thus, parents, as decision-makers for their children,
are given wide latitude in authorizing their medical care and
43
treatment.
B. The State's ParensPatriaeInterest
Despite the widely held belief that parents will act in their
child's best interest, parental authority is not absolute.4 4 In fact, if a
parent is not acting in the best interest of the child the state may
intervene. 4 5 The authority for state intervention is based on the
46
doctrine ofparens patriae.
40 See Sher, supra note 35, at 169, 171-72.
41 See Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). But see Jennifer L. Rosato,
The Ultimate Test of Autonomy: Should Minors Have a Right to Make Decisions
Regarding Life-Sustaining Treatment?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 78-79 (1996) (arguing
these presumptions do not apply to life-sustaining treatment).
42 See Parham, 442 U.S. at 602; see also Sher, supra note 35, at 171-72. For
example, the Supreme Court has articulated that an "important justification for state
deference to parental control over children is that '[t]he child is not the mere creature of
the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."' Bellotti, 443 U.S. at
637 (quoting Pierce, 268 U.S. at 602).
43See Traugott & Alpers, supra note 38, at 924.
See, e.g., Prince,321 U.S. at 166.
See generally Sher, supra note 35, at 157 (contrasting the competing
interests of parents and the state in medical treatment of minors); see also Traugott &
Alpers, supra note 38, at 924 (arguing that the best interest of the child should always
prevail, even if in opposition with the parents and the state's interest).
46 "'Parens
patriae' literally 'parent of the country,' refers traditionally
to
[the] role of [the] state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability, such as
juveniles. It is the principle that the state must care for those who cannot take care of
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Although the history of the parens patriae doctrine is a
somewhat ambiguous, 47 it has come to mean that the state has an
obligation and a right to protect the interests of its legally disabled
48
citizens, those who can not protect themselves, including children.
The Supreme Court validated the parenspatriae concept in Prince v.
Massachusetts.49 In Prince, the Court stated that "neither rights of
religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to
guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state as parens
patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring school
attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor, and in many
other ways."5
Some of the state's interests that support parens

patriae include preservation of human life, ensuring a productive and
self-perpetuating society, and, at the same time, conserving the state's
resources.5

The state typically evokes its parens patriae authority with
respect to children when parents have jeopardized or threatened their
child's health and safety.
Based on the belief that a child has the
"might to live and to grow up with a sound mind in a sound body,, 53
the state will exercise its authority and intervene in the parent-child
relationship. 54 In the medical arena, the state is mostly likely to
themselves, such as minors who lack proper care and custody from their parents."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).

See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) (stating that the meaning of parens
patriaeis "murky and its historic credentials are of dubious reliance.").
48 See Sher, supra note 35, at 170; see also Hawkins, supra note 1, at 2084.
321 U.S. at 165 (holding that a state's authority over the conduct of
children exceeds its authority to control the conduct of adults).
50Id. at 166. See also Schleifer v. Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir.
1998) (holding municipal curfew law over parental objections constitutional).
51 See Hawkins, supra note 1, at 2085; see also Rosato, supra note 41, at 70.
52 See generally Walter Wadlington, David C. Baum Memorial Lecture:
Medical Decision Making For and By Children: Tensions Between Parent, State, and
Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 311, 322-23 (1994) (explaining relevance of child abuse
reporting statutes to medical treatment cases); see also Hawkins, supra note 1, at 2084.
In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128, 132 (Ohio 1962).
See Laura M. Plastine, Comment, "In God We Trust": When Parents
Refuse Medical Treatment for Their Children Based Upon Their Sincere Religious
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intervene when the child is suffering from a serious and potentially
life-threatening illness or injury, not when the child has a minor
childhood illness. 55 Thus, the parent's right to raise their children
is
56

not absolute and must give way when the child's life is at risk.

II.

RIGHTS CURRENTLY AFFORDED ADOLESCENTS DESPITE THEIR
TRADITIONAL LEGAL DISABILITIES

It is clear that both parents and the state have legitimate
interests in the welfare of children. However, it is unclear where the
child fits in. In today's society it is not uncommon for an adolescent
to exclaim to their parent or teacher "Don't tell me what to do. I know

my rights." In reality, the expansion of minors' legal rights has been
minimal, and in fact, these rights are still limited.57
A. Emancipation

Emancipation is the "legal process by which a child is released
from the control and authority of his [or her] parent., 58 Most children
are automatically emancipated from their parents upon reaching the
age of majority, which in most jurisdictions is eighteen. 59 However,
Beliefs, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 123, 139 (1993) (exploring the right of the state to
override parental religious-based objections to their children's medical treatment).
55Id.at 139-41 (exploring the parental right to engage in faith-healing even
when a child's life is endangered).
56
Id
See Laubscher, supra note 1, at 569.
58 See 1 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW

OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE

UNITED STATES 548 (2d ed. 1987). See also Carol Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen, Minor
Changes: Emancipating Children in Modern Times, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 239, 240
(1992) (discussing use of statutory emancipation by parents as a way of coping and
dealing with troubled adolescents).
59See Robert F. Weir & Charles Peters, Affirming the Decisions Adolescents
Make About Life and Death, THE HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov. 11, 1997, at 29, 33. See
also Dana F. Castle, Early EmancipationStatutes: Should They ProtectParents as Well
as Children?, 20 FAM. L.Q. 343, 348-49 nn.35-36 (1986). After the Twenty-sixth
Amendment was enacted, granting the right to vote to eighteen-year-olds, many
jurisdictions lowered the age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen. Today, forty-four
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there are several processes by which an adolescent who has not yet
reached his or her eighteenth birthday may be emancipated from his or
her parents or guardian and thus, have the rights (and responsibilities)
First, in many states,
of adulthood conferred upon him or her.
minors are automatically emancipated if they enter military service
and marry.

Second, many states have statutes that allow minors who meet
the requirements set forth therein to be emancipated from their
parents. For instance, in California, if a minor can demonstrate that
he or she: "(1) is at least fourteen years of age; (2) able to manage his
or her own affairs; (3) lives separate and apart from parents with
either parental consent or acquiescence; and (4) receives income
derived from legal activity, ' 63 the minor may be legally
emancipated. 64 The court is ultimately left with the discretion to deny
an emancipation request if it believes doing so would be in the
minor's best interest. 65 One factor this and other statutes do not
require a judge to consider is whether the minor is actually competent
the focus is on the minor's
to live on his or her own. 66 Instead,
67
parents.
her
or
his
from
independence
jurisdictions have a statutory age of majority of eighteen. Id. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 7002 (West 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.4 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); Mo.
REv. STAT. § 452.340.3 (1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17B-3 (West 1976); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-13.4(c) (1994); W. VA. CODE § 2-3-1 (1992).
60 See generally Laubscher, supra note 1, at 578-80; John C. Polifka, The
Status of Emancipated Minors in Iowa: The Case For a Clearly Drafted Statute, 44

DRAKE L. REV. 39, 45-48 (1995) (arguing emancipation statutes are preferable to
common law); Batterman, supra note 9, at 641.
61 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7002; see also Redding, supra note 34, at

712; Laubscher, supra note 1, at 578.
62 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.590 (Miche Supp. 1994); CAL. FAM.
CODE §§ 7000-143 (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-108 to -110 (1993);
MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 722.4-.4e (West 1993).
63 See Polifka, supra note 60, at 45.
64 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7120 (West Supp. 1994).
65 See Polifka, supra note 60, at 45.
66 See Rosato, supra note 41, at 28.
67 Id.
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Finally, some states recognize a common law right to
emancipation. In these states, minors petition the court, and "[t]heir
status is judicially determined on a case-by-case basis." 69 The factors
enumerated in emancipation statutes tend to be the same ones
considered by judges in common law states. 70 For example, in New
York, a common law emancipated minor is one whose parents have
71
surrendered control over the child's behavior and personal affairs.
As a result, the doctrine is typically discussed in cases regarding the
72
payment of child support.
For the minor whose petition for an emancipation decree is
granted he or she is bestowed with all of the rights and responsibilities
of an adult.73 Besides being free from the control and authority of
their parents, emancipated minors are able to enter into binding
contracts, sue in their own names, establish their own residences,
retain their own earnings, receive public assistance, consent to their
own medical treatments, execute either living wills or proxy
74
directives.

B. Abortion and PersonalHealth Rights
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the
68 Id. at 43 (stating that Iowa is a common law emancipation state); see also
Batterman, supra note 9, at 645-46.
69 See Polifka, supra note 60, at 43.; see also Smith v. Seibly, 431 P.2d 719
(Wash. 1967) (recognizing that emancipation of minors may occur even in the absence of
a statute).
70 See generally Batterman, supra note 9, at 641. Courts will look at whether
the minor is living separate and apart from his or her parents; self-supporting; managing
his or her own financial affairs; and if emancipating the minor is in his or her best
interest. Id.
71 See Batterman, supra note 9, at 645-46.
72 Id.at 646.
73 See Sanger, supra note 58, at 240-41 (explaining that because
such
minor's attain legal adulthood prior to reaching the age of majority, such emancipated
minors may engage in adult acts, such as signing binding contracts, keeping their own
property, and disobeying their parents).
74 See generally Polifka, supra note 60, at 47; Redding, supra
note 34, at
712; Batterman, supra note 9, at 647-48; Rosato, supra note 41, at 34-35.
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Constitution grants minors a right to privacy. 75 The reach of these

decisions, however, have been primarily limited to the areas of
reproductive rights and limited personal health care issues. 76 The first
major step77was taken by the Supreme Court in PlannedParenthoodv.
Danforth, which extended the fundamental
privacy right to choose
78
abortion to unmarried, minor women.

In Danforth, the Supreme Court was considering the
constitutionality of a Missouri statute that required written parental

consent before an unmarried woman under the age of eighteen could
have an abortion. 79 Since the right to choose an abortion flows from a

fundamental right to privacy the applicable standard for evaluating the
effect of the Missouri statute was strict scrutiny. In its analysis the
Court first recognized that minors do have constitutional rights 81 and
declared that the statute imposed an unconstitutional burden on the
minor's privacy right. 82 According to the Court, this burden was a
result of the Missouri legislature granting a third party "an absolute,
75See Jan C. Costello, Making Kids Take Their Medicine: The Privacy
and
Due Process Rights of De Facto Competent Minors, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 907, 908
(1998) (forwarding that the right to privacy includes, but is not limited to the right to
protect bodily integrity and to make health care decisions).
76 See Fouts Skeels, supra note 24, at 1213.
77 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
78 See generally Katherine M. Waters, Judicial Consent to Abort: Assessing
a Minor's Maturity, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 90, 94-95 (1985); Rosato, supra note 41, at
16 (commenting on the Supreme Court's deferential position on minor's abortion rights).
79
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
80 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 & 155 (1973). Roe established that
the right of privacy is broad enough to encompass abortion and reiterated that the right of
privacy is a fundamental right triggering strict scrutiny analysis. Id. at 153. A regulation
that limits fundamental rights will only survive strict scrutiny if there is a compelling state
interest and the regulation is "narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests
at stake." Id. at 155.
81 See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. The Danforth Court recognized that
"constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains
the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights." Id.; see also Fouts Skeels, supra note 24,
at 1210.
82 See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
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and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his
patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason
for withholding the consent." 83 The Court then examined whether
the parents' interest may nevertheless outweigh the minor's right of
privacy. 84 However, the Court concluded "[a]ny independent interest
the parent may have in the termination of the minor daughter's
pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of privacy
of the
8
pregnant."
become
have
to
enough
competent minor mature
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court placed a limitation on the
minor's fundamental right to choose an abortion. 86 The Court stated:
"[O]ur holding ...

does not suggest that every minor, regardless of

age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her
pregnancy." 87 Thus, the Danforth Court established that only mature
minors could choose an abortion without parental consent. 88 How a
89
minor's maturity was determined was left unanswered .
Justice
White's dissent criticized the majority's lack of detail in their opinion
and stated that states are entitled to protect minors "from their own
immature and improvident decisions; and there is absolutely no reason
expressed
by the majority why the State may not utilize that method
90
here."
The next major decision about a minor's fundamental right to
choose an abortion was enunciated in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II). 91
The Bellotti Court held that states must provide an alternative to
parental consent for a minor's seeking an abortion. 92 Accordingly,
83 Id.
84

Id. at 75.

85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75.
88 See Waters, supra note 78, at 95.
89

Id.

90 See Danforth,428 U.S. at 95 (White, J. dissenting).
91 443 U.S. 622 (1979). In Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976), the Court
remanded the case to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to construe a statute
which regulated minors' abortions. Id. at 151-52.
92 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643.
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states must afford a minor an alternative procedure in which she can
demonstrate that she is "mature enough and well enough informed to
make her abortion decision." 9 3 It is important to note that the burden
was on the minor to rebut the presumption that she is incompetent of
making decisions about her medical care. 94 If the court does not
believe that the minor is mature enough, the judge may still grant the
minor the right to have an abortion without parental consent or
95
notification, as long as it would be in the minor's best interest.
Another pivotal case involving minors and their privacy was
Carey v. PopulationServices International.96 In Carey, the Supreme
Court addressed a minor's access to contraception. 9 7 At issue in
Carey was a New York statute which prohibited the distribution of
non-medical contraceptives to persons sixteen or older, and entirely
prohibited distribution to children under sixteen. 98 Reiterating the
principle that the right to privacy extends to minors as well as adults,
the Court found the statute unconstitutional because the state failed to
show a significant interest that outweighs the minors right to
privacy.9 9
In addition to reproductive rights, minors have been granted
minimum rights in other areas of personal health.1l° These laws are

Id.
94See Costello, supra note 75, at 909-10; see also Satsie Veith, The
Judicial
Bypass Procedure and Adolescents' Abortion Rights: The Fallacy of the "Maturity"
Standard,23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 453, 455 (1994).
95See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at
650.

96431 U.S. 678 (1977).
97

1d.

98 Individuals sixteen years of age and older were able
to receive
contraceptives from a licensed pharmacist. Id. at 681-82; see also Hawkins, supra note 1,
at 2097-98.
99See Carey, 431 U.S. at 694-96; see also Hawkins, supra note 1, at 2098;
Jessica A. Penkower, The PotentialRight of Chronically Ill Adolescents to Refuse LifeSaving Medical Treatment - Fatal Misuse of the Mature Minor Doctrine, 45 DEPAUL L.

REv. 1165, 1182-83 (1996).
100 See Penkower, supra note 99, at 1178 (including sexually transmitted

diseases, alcohol and substance abuse, and psychiatric care).
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often referred to as age of consent laws 10 1 and usually involve medical
decisions relating to treatment of sexually transmitted diseases,
alcohol, and substance abuse. ° 2 These statutory exceptions to the

common law rule requiring parental consent for medical treatment of
minors evolved due to the increase of sexually transmitted diseases
among adolescents and the perception that adolescents would not seek
treatment if they needed to first inform their parents. 10 3 Neither the
minor's maturity or decision-making capacity were factors in the
passing of these laws. 104 Further, the laws focus upon a minor's right
10 5
to consent to treatment, not his or her right to refuse treatment.
Statutes that permit minors to obtain alcohol and substance abuse

treatment,06 and mental health care were enacted on the same
premise. 1
C. The Mature Minor Doctrine
The "mature minor" doctrine is a relatively new legal concept
which allows some minors to consent to medical treatment without
parental consent. 10 7 However, only a few states have recognized this

doctrine, and the Supreme Court has yet to declare it applicable to

101 See generally Redding, supra note 34, at 712; Rosato, supra note 41, at
30-31.

102 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN., § 26-6-18 (1999) (permitting minors to

consent to treatment for sexually transmitted diseases without parental consent); N. Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2305(2) (McKinney 1993) (authorizing diagnosis, treatment and
prescription of persons under 21 years of age infected with, or exposed to, sexually
transmissible diseases without parental consent); N. Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 21.11
(McKinney Supp. 1994) (allowing treatment of minors for substance abuse problems
without parental consent if "such treatment is necessary for the best interests of the
child"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17A-4 (West 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325-2.D (1992);
see also Felsman, supra note 8, at 354.
103 See Penkower, supra note 99, at 1178; see also Felsman, supra note 8, at
342-45.
104 See Penkower, supra note 99, at 1178.
105 See Rosato, supra note 41, at 31.
106 Id.
107 See Batterman, supra note 9, at 641.
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10 8
medical treatment decisions outside of reproductive rights.
In an early case, In re Green,109 physicians sought to perform

a spinal fusion to sixteen year old Ricky Green, who suffered from
severe curvature of the spine with accompanying paralytic
scoliosis. 110 However, there was no evidence that the condition was
life threatening or that it was necessary to immediately perform the
Ricky's mother, however, refused to consent to the
operation.
procedure since blood transfusions would be necessary. 112 Although
Ricky was initially excluded from the decision-making process, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that it would be "most
anomalous to ignore Ricky in this situation when we consider the
preference of an intelligent child of sufficient maturity" 113 and
matter, holding that Ricky's personal choices should be
remanded the
114
considered.
Several years later, the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized
in Cardwell v. Bechtol the mature minor exception to parental consent

for medical treatment.11 5 Cardwell involved an action against an
108Id.; see also Hawkins, supra note 1, at 2100-01. See, e.g., ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 20-9-602(7) (Michie 1991) (granting "[a]ny unemancipated minor of sufficient
intelligence to understand and appreciate the consequences of the proposed surgical or
medical treatment or procedures" the legal ability to consent to said treatment); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 129.030(2) (1991) (stating if a minor "understands the nature and purpose of the
proposed examination or treatment and its probable outcome, and voluntarily requests it"
his or her consent alone is sufficient). State appellate courts in Georgia, Illinois, Maine,
Michigan, Missouri, and Tennessee have held that life-sustaining medical treatment may
be withheld or withdrawn from adolescents. See Weir, supra note 59, at 29 (arguing that
adolescents are capable of making health care decisions and that advance directives
should be used by adolescents to allow them to participate in their treatment).
109 In re Green, 292 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1972), aff'd, 307 A.2d 279 (Pa. 1973).
110 Id. at 388.
Ill Id.
112 Id.
113 See In re Green, 292 A.2d at 392.
114 Id. But see Commonwealth v. Nixon, 718 A.2d 311 (Pa. Super. 1998)
(holding mature minor doctrine does not allow a mature minor to refuse medical
treatment in life-threatening situations).
115 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987); see also Joan-Margaret Kun, Rejecting the
Adage "Children Should Be Seen and Not Heard" -

The Mature Minor Doctrine, 16
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osteopath who had treated Sandra Cardwell, without the consent of
her parents, five months prior to her eighteenth birthday. 116 The Court
noted that several Tennessee laws "recognize[d] the varying degrees
17
of responsibility and maturity of minors [fourteen] years and older""
and also considered the "Rule of Sevens" 1 18 which presumes different
levels of capacity depending on the age of the minor. 119 The court
concluded that a mature minor exception to parental consent does
exist, however, it affirmed the jury's verdict that Sandra did not
have
120
capacity to consent and did not effectively consent to treatment.
Two years later, the Illinois Supreme Court in In re E.G.,
recognized that minors have a common law right to refuse medical
treatment.
E.G. was a seventeen and a half-year-old girl with acute
nonlymphatic leukemia who needed blood transfusions to treat the
disease.' 22 Both E.G. and her mother were Jehovah's Witnesses and
refused to consent to the treatment because of their belief that
receiving a blood transfusion violates the Bible's prohibition against
consuming blood. 12 3 The Illinois State Attorney General sought a
judicial determination that E.G. was medically neglected and in need
of treatment. The trial court agreed and appointed a temporary
PACE L. REV. 423, 430-32 (1996).
116 724 S.W.2d at 742-43.
117 Id. at 745.
118 Id. "The Rule of Sevens" presumes different levels of capacity depending

on the age of the child. Id. According to the Rule a child under the age of seven lacks
capacity. Id. Between the ages of seven and fourteen there is a rebuttable presumption of
lack of capacity. Id. For children between the ages of fourteen and twenty-one there is a
rebuttable presumption of capacity. Id. See also Kun, supra note 115, at 431.
119 Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 745.
120 Id. at 756.
121 549 N.E.2d 322 at 328 (Il1. 1989).

122 Id. at 323; see also William D. Brewster, Casenote, In Re E.G., A Minor:
Death Over Life: A Judicial Trend Continues as the Illinois Supreme Court Grants
Minors the Right to Refuse Life-Saving Medical Treatment, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 771,
772-73 (1990).

123 See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 323; see also Brewster, supra note 122, at
n. 14 (citing J. PENTON, APOCALYPSE DELAYED: THE STORY OF JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES 153
(1985)) "[Jehovah's] Witnesses believe that taking blood transfusions is contrary to the
teachings of Genesis 9:4, Leviticus 3:17, and Acts 15:29". Id.
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guardian to make E.G.'s treatment decisions. 124 On appeal the
appellate court held that E.G. was a mature minor and her
constitutional right125to exercise her religion permitted her to refuse
blood transfusions.
The State appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, which in
turn granted certiorari. 126 Since the United States Supreme Court had
not recognized that either adults or minors have a constitutional right
to refuse life-saving medical treatment, the court based its decision on
case law and Illinois statutes to conclude that a minor, with judicial
approval, could refuse medical treatment. 12 7 The court stated that in
the absence of a statute, a trial judge should determine "whether128a
minor is mature enough to make health care choices on her own."
However, the court stated that the right must be balanced against four
state interests: "(1) the preservation of life; (2) protecting the interests
of third parties; (3) prevention of suicide; and (4) maintaining the
ethical integrity of the medical profession." 2 9 Since E.G. was130no
longer a minor, the court did not remand the case to the trial court.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court has also recognized that a
minor has a right to refuse life-sustaining procedures. 13 1 In In re
Swan, Chad Swan was involved in a car accident nine months before
132
his eighteenth birthday that left him in a persistent vegetative state.
The court found clear and convincing evidence that on more than one
occasion prior to the accident, Chad had expressed his desire not to be
kept on life-sustaining equipment, and therefore, his prior statements
were controlling. 133 Thus, Chad's parents were allowed to determine
124 See Brewster, supra note 122 at 773-74.
125 In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d 286, at 290-91(111. App. Ct. 1987).

126 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 at 323 (Il1.1989).
127 Id. at 325, 328.
Id. at 327.
29

Id. at 328.

130 Id
131 See In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202 (Me. 1990) (per curiam).

Id. at 1203.
133 Id. at 1204-05. See also Rosato, supra note 41, at 40-41.

916

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

[Vol. XVI

whether or not to re-insert a gastronomy tube. 134 The court's decision
also noted the common law presumption of competency for persons
fourteen years and older, 135 that persons attain capacity at different
ages, 136 and the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in In re E.G.. 137
Most recently the Massachusetts Appeals Court considered
whether a superior court judge erred in entering an order authorizing
blood transfusions to a seventeen-year old Jehovah's Witness.' 38 In a
pro-adolescents' rights decision, the court vacated the lower court's
order. 139 Because Rena was no longer hospitalized the court
concluded the issue was moot and did not remand the case for
additional proceedings.'
Clearly defining the applicable test, 14 1 the
court placed particular emphasis on evaluating the minor's
maturity. 142 In addition, the court directed judges to also consider the
minor's wishes, if applicable, his or her religious convictions, and to
receive testimony directly from the minor.' 4 3 Accordingly, the Rena
decision grants minors the right to determine their medical treatment
and if their decision is contested by their parents or physician, they
have judicial recourse.
Thus, the mature minor doctrine seeks to balance the privacy
interests of the minor with the legitimate interests of the state and the
parents.14 4 However, critics have argued that the doctrine is vague
134 Swan, 569 A.2d at 1206.
135 Id. at 1205.
13 6 Id.
137 Id
Id
138 See In re Rena, 705 N.E. 2d 1155 (Mass. 1999).
13 9 1d.
140 Id. at 1157.

141 Id. at 1157 (stating " (1) the patient's expressed preferences, if any; (2)
the patient's religious convictions, if any; (3) the impact on the patient's family; (4) the
probability of adverse side effects from the treatment; (5) the prognosis without
treatment; and (6) the present and future incompetency of the patient in making that
decision"). 142
Id.

143 Id.
144 See Waters, supra note 78, at 90; Kohm & Lawrence, supra note 21, at
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and ambiguous and fails to provide judges with clear guidelines for

determining maturity. 145 Furthermore, other states have refused to
adopt the mature minor doctrine. 146 As a result, minors in only a few
to exercise their privacy
states may rely on the mature minor doctrine
147
right to decide their own medical treatment.

III. THE NEED FOR CONSISTENCY: EXTENDING PRIVACY RIGHTS AND THE
RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION TO ADOLESCENTS' MEDICAL
TREATMENT

In Massachusetts, a sixteen-year-old boy ran away from home

to avoid chemotherapy treatment despite his parents' consent. 14 8 In
California, a fifteen year old girl fled her home after being physically
forced to succumb to chemotherapy, despite both her parents' and her

376.

145 See Waters, supra note 78, at 92, 98; see also Brewster, supra note 122,

at 779 (arguing that the court's holding. in In re E.G. was incorrect, because it did not
adequately consider precedent case law, ignored the fact that blood transfusions were in
E.G.'s best interest, and did not recognize the differences between abortion cases and
blood transfusions); Rosato, supra note 41, at 22 (criticizing the courts that apply the
mature minor doctrine for being too broad based in analysis).
146 See, e.g., Novak v. Cobb County-Kennestone Hospital Authority, 849
F.Supp. 1559 (N.D. Ga., 1994); In re Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 557 N.Y.S.2d
239 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (holding minor could not refuse blood transfusions due to lack
of maturity, despite minor being only one month shy of his eighteenth birthday and
refusing to adopt a mature minor doctrine); Commonwealth v. Nixon, 718 A.2d 311 (Pa.
1998) (holding parents' have a duty to override their child's refusal of medical treatment
in life-threatening situations, despite child's mature minor status); O.G. v. Baum, 790
S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (distinguishing In re E.G. on the basis that the minor
did not testify and that Texas did not have a mature minor standard); see generally Kun,
supra note 115, at 439-41.
147 See discussion supra Part II.C.
148 See Traugott & Alpers, supra note 38, at 922-23; Hawkins, supra note 1,
at 2075. In 1994, Billy Best of Norwell, Massachusetts ran away to Texas to avoid
chemotherapy because "[he] could not stand going to the hospital every week" and felt
like the medicine was killing him instead of curing him. See Traugott & Alpers, supra
note 38, at 923. After being persuaded to return home through the media, Billy and his
parents chose alternative therapy. Id. at 923.
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lack of consent. 149 Another fifteen-year old who, with parental
consent, chose to discontinue his medication and decline a third liver
transplant, was forcibly removed by police from his home and
hospitalized. 15 Another fifteen year old, suffering from end-stage
cystic fibrosis, was placed on a ventilator despite his repeated wishes
against life-prolonging
measures, such as intubation and mechanical
1
ventilation. I
The laws throughout this country are inconsistent with respect
152
to a minor's ability to make his or her own medical decisions.
Depending on the state, a minor may be able to obtain an abortion or
treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, but that same minor may
not be able to choose the course of treatment'for cancer.1 53 Further, a
minor as young as fourteen years old may be declared emancipated,
based on financial independence, and may subsequently make his or
her own medical decisions.1 54 However, a terminally ill minor
who
155
treatment.
medical
refuse
cannot
support
has his or her family's
149 See Traugott & Alpers, supra note 38, at 923; Hawkins, supra note 1, at
2075. Lee Lor, a Hmong refugee, and her parents believed that "surgically removing the
cancer would cause it to recur in someone else" and that Lee would be unable to fill her
traditional role in Hmong society if the treatment resulted in infertility. See Traugott,
supra note 38, at 923. A court order resulted in the forcible removal of Lee from her
home and submission to chemotherapy, which Lee described as "torture." Id. at 923.
150 See Traugott & Alpers, supra note 38, at 923. Benny Agrelo was eight
years old when he underwent his first liver-transplant. Five years later the a second liver
transplant was performed. Id. Following this procedure Benny, which his mother's
approval, decided to discontinue his medication therapy based on the desire to have "a
few months of health" instead of "long-term survival with pain." Id. At fifteen Benny's
doctors wanted to perform a third transplant and Benny and his mother refused, resulting
in a court order to hospitalize Benny. Id. Eventually a judge ruled that Benny could
return home without resuming his medication. Benny died two months later. Id.
151 See Weir, supra note 59, at 30. C.G. was hospitalized four times during
his last year of life and repeatedly stated that he knew he did not have much longer to live
and did not want to be on a ventilator. Id.
152 See Sher, supra note 35, at 159.
153 See, e.g., Kun, supra note 115, at 424-25 (discussing the case of Billy

Best who ran away from home after two and one-half months of chemotherapy and
learning from doctors that four more months of treatment was required).
154 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 149-150 and accompanying text.
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A. Informed Consent
A patient must give informed consent before a physician may
proceed with treatment. 156 This common law doctrine requires a
physician to explain to the patient the diagnosis, treatment options, the
risks and benefits of each option, and prognosis. 157 If a physician fails
to explain these issues and fails to obtain the consent of the patient, he
or she may be liable for an intentional tort of battery. 158 This doctrine
59
resulted from common law out of respect for individual autonomy1
and continues to allow "individuals the freedom to make160 certain
choices about their lives that comport with their own values."'
The right to be informed about medical treatment and to
consent to or refuse treatment is a fundamental right, afforded only to
adults. 16 1 As early as 1891, the United States Supreme Court declared
in.Union Pacific Railway Company v. Botsford162 that "[n]o right is
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his
156

See Penkower, supra note 99, at 1170 (discussing the doctrine of
informed consent as it applies to adults); see also Hawkins, supra note 1, at 2093-94;
Rosato, supra note 41, at 10-14.
See Penkower, supra note 99, at 1170; see also Hawkins, supra note 1, at
2093.
158 See Hawkins, supra note 1, at 2094 (explaining the common law doctrine
of informed consent and one's right to make treatment decisions).
159 See Hawkins, supra note 1, at 2094; see also Penkower, supra note 99, at
1169-70; Redding, supranote 34, at 704-05; Rosato, supra note 41, at 10-11.
160 See Penkower, supra note 99, at 1169.
161 See Andrew Popper, Averting Malpractice By Information: Informed
Consent in the PediatricTreatment Environment, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 819, 821-22 (1998)
(suggesting initiation of a broad survey to learn what occurs when children are informed
about treatment decisions); see also Julie A. Koehne, Witnesses on Trial: Judicial
Intrusion Upon the Practicesof Jehovah's Witness Parents, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 205,
207 (1993) (arguing that Jehovah's Witnesses should be able "to adhere to the principles
of their chosen faith and raise their children accordingly without interference from
courts").
162 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
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own person, free from all restraint or interference of others.
The
Botsford court specifically held that an individual could not be forced
to submit to unwanted medical treatment. 164 The Court has affirmed
this right in more recent cases, including the so-called "right to die
case": Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health.16 5 Although some
have declared that Cruzan finally established a constitutional right to
die,166 the Court only stated that "a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment." '16 7 Thus, a patient who may give consent to a
treatment plan may also withhold 1consent
and either forego all
68
treatment or seek alternative methods.
On the contrary, when it comes 'to treatment decisions for
minors, the right of informed consent does not rest with the adolescent
patient, it rests with his or her parents or legal guardians. 16 9 If a
parent refuses "necessary" treatment, the state can challenge that
decision, claiming neglect, and can obtain both temporary legal
custody and the authorization to make treatment decisions for the
minor child. 17
The minor's wishes and desires are virtually
171
ignored.
Occasionally, the parents will agree with the physicians
172
on the preferred course of treatment, but the minor will disagree.
When the minor's choice is different than that of his or her parents
and physician, litigation is unlikely because there is not a legal
Id.at 251.
164 Id.at 257.
165 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (stating that value of bodily integrity is
embodied in the doctrine of informed consent). See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 175 (1952) (holding that forced stomach pumping is "offensive to human dignity.");
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) (stating that the "integrity of an
individual's person is a cherished value in our society.").
166 See Penkower, supra note 99, at 1172 & n.40.
167 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
168 See Penkower, supra note 99, at 1170.
169 See Hawkins, supra note 1, at 2079.
1701d

171 Id.at 2080.
172 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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173
process that allows a minor to challenge the parent's consent.
Thus, when an unemancipated minor needs medical treatment, with
the exception of an abortion or treatment for a sexually transmitted

disease, the premise that minors are incapable
of making informed
174
decisions and that adults know best prevails.
B. Adolescents Are Capable of Making Informed Decisions
Crucial to successful medical treatment is the consent,
cooperation, and participation of the patient. 175
The medical

community, as well as some legal scholars, have realized that minors
should be allowed to participate in determining what course their
medical treatment should take and that minors are in fact capable of
doing so. 17 6 In fact, researchers have found "that children often are

capable of making important life decisions in a rational matter,
' 177
including decisions about medical and psychological treatment."
Further, if a minor is included in the decision-making process and
provides informed consent for his or her treatment the effectiveness of
the treatment will improve.178
173 See Hawkins, supra note 1, at 2080 (hypothesizing that even if a
mechanism existed courts would probably not consider the case on the basis that minors
lack legal standing and parents have ultimate authority over their children).
174 See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (stating "most
children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments... including
their need for medical care or treatment. Parents can and must make those judgments.");
see also Popper, supra note 161, at 833 (discussing results of a survey of pediatricians in
which more than half agreed that "parental anxiety or other factors . . . cause many
parents to consent... without fully exploring the alternatives and risks of treatment").
175 See Michael A. Grodin & Joel J. Alpert, Informed Consent and Pediatric
Care, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT, 93 at 94 (Gary B. Melton et. al. eds.,

1983); see also Redding, supra note 34, at 709 (stating that "[c]linicians agree treatment
outcomes are poor when children are forced to receive treatment").
176 See Redding, supra note 34, at 708; see also Hawkins, supra note 1, at
2118-19; Weir, supra note 59, at 31.
177 See Redding, supra note 34, at 707.
178 See Redding, supra note 34, at 709 (discussing the impact of recent
research on the traditional views of children's competence); see also Popper, supra note
161, at 826 (stating that "the rate and quality of healing and recovery is higher with
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Recognizing the discrepancies in statutory and case law, the
American Academy of Pediatrics Task Force '"the Task Force")
issued guidelines for physicians who treat minors.
The Task Force
declared that if the procedure is either elective surgery or treatment
and the minor is thirteen years of age or older, the minor's written
consent should be obtained.18 0 In addition, the Task Force suggested
that children older than seven years of age should be provided an
opportunity to also consent or assent to treatment.! 81 In determining
whether a child between seven and thirteen years old is able to
comprehend the implications of undergoing or foregoing a medical
procedure, the Task Force instructs pediatricians to consider the
child's "age, disease, severity, prognosis, risks, and proposed benefits
of therapy," as well as expert opinions concerning the adolescent
"patient's
level of intelligence, reasoning ability, and emotional
82
,1

state."

Adolescents as young as twelve years of age are capable of
understanding the nature of their medical problems. 83 Some
informed patients than with those who do not understand the nature of their treatments").
179 See American Academy of Pediatrics, Task Force on Pediatric Research,
Informed Consent, and Medical Ethics, Consent, 57 PEDIATRICS 414, 415 (1976); see also
Weir, supra note 59, at 32 (discussing the Pediatric Bill of Rights, adopted by the
National Association of Children's Hospitals in 1974, which states any minor "who is of
sufficient intelligence to appreciate the nature and consequences of the proposed medical
care and if such medical care is for his own benefit, may effectively consent to such
medical care in doctor-patient confidentiality"); The United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.S. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49 at 166, U.N.
Doc. A/44/736 (1989), revised by U.N. doc. A/RES/44/25/Corr.1 (1990), reprinted in 28
I.L.M. 1456 (1989). "States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his
or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child,
the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of
the child." Id. President Clinton signed the Convention in 1995, however, the United
States Congress has not ratified the Convention.
180 See Grodin & Alpert, supra note 175, at 95 (detailing the proclamations
of the American Academy of Pediatrics).
181 Id
182 Id.

183 See generally Redding, supra note 34, at 708; Grodin, supra note 175, at
96-97; Weir, supra note 59, at 31; Traugott & Alpers, supra note 38, at 924. The
variation in an agreed upon age of competency lends further support for the need to
evaluate a minor's competence on an individual basis. See Rosato, supra note 41, at 51.
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professionals are concerned that adolescent patients, who by nature
are seeking to establish their independence and individualism, may
choose a course of treatment that is not within their best interests in an
184
effort to gain the acceptance of their peers or defy their parents.
However, this is not true of all adolescents. 85 Thus, it is imperative
for physicians to put aside preconceived notions of adolescent nature
and focus on' the individual adolescent patient's maturity and
86

capacity. 1
The problem however, is that the courts continue to rely on
"traditional assumptions about children's abilities, and idealistic views
187
about the role of parents in making decisions for their children."'
Thus, if the physician follows the Task Force guidelines 188 and
respects the adolescent patient's choice to refuse treatment the state
may still intervene and consent
to the procedure against the wishes of
89
1
parents.
and
patient
the

IV. WHEN THE ADOLESCENT SHOULD DECIDE

Since adolescents are capable of making competent decisions,
the question becomes whether it is appropriate for them to do so and
what limitations, if any, should be placed on their decision-making
184 See Grodin & Alpert, supra note 175, at 96; see also Traugott & Alpers,
supra note 38, at 924.
185 See Grodin & Alpert, supra note 175, at 96-97.
186 Id. at 96-97. Grodin and Alpert also point out that the type of illness is a
critical factor in determining the significance to be placed on a minor's articulated desire.
Id. at 97. Thus, the more chronic disease the more likely that the minor is capable of
making an informed, competent decision, based on a significant history of dealing with
the illness. Id.
187 Redding, supra
note 34, at 705 and discussion of United States Supreme
Court cases at 705-06.
188 But see Popper, supra note 161, at 822.

"In practice, however, 'few

children are asked if they agree ... to having a blood test, or to being given a drug, or to
having an operation."' Id. (quoting George Rylance, Making Decisions with Children:A
Child's Rights to Share in Health Decisions Can No Longer Be Ignored, 312 BRIT. MED.
J. 794, 794 (1996)).
189 See supra notes 148-152 and accompanying text.
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process. Many children's rights advocates believe that a presumption
of competence should be extended to adolescents, allowing them 19to
0
make medical treatment decisions unless proven incompetent.
Changing this exception and extending the fundamental right of
informed consent and bodily integrity to adolescents will grant greater
autonomy and freedom to the minor and will place the burden on
those who wish to abridge these rights.' 9'
Medical decisions are premised on the belief that the treatment
chosen will promote the best interests of the patient. Supposedly, this
will mean that the ,expected benefits of treatment will outweigh the
possible harms. 192 Thus, in making the decision several factors, such
as the quality and duration of life, the adverse effects and duration of
therapy, and the likelihood of success, will be important variables in
deciding what form of treatment is best for the individual
adolescent. 193 Values and cultural perspectives will also play a very
194
important role in determining the appropriate course of treatment.
For some adolescent patients, quality of life, during what is inevitably
the end-stages of a terminal illness may be more important than
extended treatment with limited benefits. 195 Other adolescent patients
may place a higher value on the
ability to play and interact with peers
96
1
hospitalized.
being
instead of
The ability to cure a minor's illness is also an important factor
in considering whether to order treatment regardless of objections by
the parents or the minor. 197 There is currently an indication that the
190 See Hawkins, supra note 1, at 2129 (putting forth the ideas of children's
rights advocates Hillary Rodham Clinton and Henry Foster's position "that the
presumption that children are incompetent should be set aside"). See also Weir, supra
note 59, at 36 (advocating for a rebuttable presumption of competence in adolescents
between fourteen and seventeen).
191 See Weir, supra note 59, at 39.
192See Traugott & Alpers, supra note
38, at 924.

Id. at 925.
194 Id.
195 Id
196 Id.
197 See Plastine, supra note 54, at 150.
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courts will be more willing to respect the adolescent patient's or the
198
parents' choice if the child is suffering from an incurable affliction.
For instance, in Newmark v. Williams,199 the Supreme Court of
Delaware held that Colin Newmark was not a neglected child under
Delaware law, and the State could not intervene and compel treatment

because the egregious facts of Colin's case outweighed the State's
authority to intervene in the parent-child relationship. 200 Colin
suffered from a deadly form of pediatric cancer and the proposed
20 1
course of treatment offered less than a 40% chance of "success."

Although Colin was too young to be involved in deciding what
treatment would be utilized, 202 his parents, practicing Christian
Scientists, 2°3 desired to treat their son spiritually through prayer
198

See, e.g., Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1991); See
In re
Philip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980)
(upholding parents' constitutional right of parental autonomy by respecting their decision
to withhold cardiac surgery for their twelve year old child who was suffering from a
congenital heart deformity and Down's syndrome); In re Green, 292 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1972)
(upholding wishes of parents who refused blood transfusions for child with paralytic
scoliosis); In re D.P., No. 91950 (Santa Clara County Juv. Ct. July 3, 1986) (holding that
fourteen year old cancer patient who refused blood transfusions could not be kept in the
hospital against her will). But see In re Sieferth, 127 N.E.2d 820 (N.Y. 1955) (declining
to order surgery to correct child's cleft palate and harelip when there was no serious threat
to child's life or health).
199 588 A.2d 1108.
200 Id. at 1118. The Court focused on the nature of the proposed treatment,
stating that it was "highly invasive, painful, involved terrible temporary and potentially
permanent side effects, posed an unacceptably low chance of success, and a high risk that
the treatment itself would cause death." Id.
201 See id. at 1109-10. Colin was only three years old when diagnosed with
Burkitt's Lymphoma. Id.
202 Although Colin was unable to make his own treatment decisions, this
case illustrates that the courts are not going to order treatment over objections of those
legally authorized to give consent if the illness is incurable. Should the laws be expanded
to grant adolescents the right to give or with hold consent this premise would likely apply.
Id. at 1118.
203 The First Church of Christ, Scientist, was founded in 1879 by Mary
Baker Eddy and teaches its members that diseases and sickness are manifestations of the
mind that can be overcome by praying and drawing closer to God. See Janna C. Merrick,
Christian Science Healing of Minor Children: Spiritual Exemption Statutes, First
Amendment Rights, and Fair Notice, 10 ISSUEs L. & MED. 321, 325 (1994); see also
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In contrast, when a minor's

condition is life threatening, but curable, courts have declared minors
neglected when parents withhold consent for treatment. 20 5 Further,
the courts will intervene even in situations where the minor's
affliction is not life threatening. 206 Thus, the courts will be less likely
to intervene and order medical treatment
as "the level of bodily
20 7
invasion rises and the prognosis dims."

A. The Physician'sRole

The physician has a key role in the decision-making process,
and that role should begin long before choosing or implementing the
course of treatment. 208 The physician must educate both the
adolescent and his or her family about treatment options and expected
outcomes and negotiate a treatment plan that is acceptable to everyone
Elizabeth A. Lingle, Treating Children by Faith Colliding ConstitutionalIssues, 17 J.
LEGAL MED. 301, 306 (1996).

204 See Newmark, 588 A.2d at 1109.
205 See, e.g., People ex rel. D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1982) (holding that
when parents refuse medical treatment for their child on religious grounds, the state can
meet its burden by demonstrating that the child suffers from a life-threatening, but curable
condition); In re Ivey, 319 So. 2d 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (ordering bloodtransfusions for a child whose life was endangered by the parents refusal to consent to the
procedure); In re McCauley, 565 N.E.2d 411 (Mass. 1991) (holding that life-saving blood
transfusions were in the best interest of the child and outweighed the parents'
constitutional objections).
206 See, e.g., In re Eric B., 235 Cal. Rptr. 22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (ordering
periodic monitoring of child to detect possible reoccurrence of cancer over parents'
religious objections); In re Karwath, 199 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 1972) (ordering surgical
removal of child's tonsils and adenoids over father's religious objections); In re Sampson,
317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970), aff'd, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971),
aff'd, 278 N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1972) (ordering child to undergo a risky surgical procedure
that would partially correct, but not cure, child's non-life-threatening facial deformity,
over his mother's religious objections); In re Gregory S., 380 N.Y.S.2d 620 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. 1976) (upholding state intervention where mother refused medical and dental care for
child suffering from cavities, fractured teeth, and an umbilical hernia); Mitchell v. Davis,
205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (holding that mother's faith in spiritual healing
was not a defense to a prosecution for child neglect where mother refused to provide
medical treatment for son's arthritic knee).
207 See Plastine, supranote 54, at 149.
208 See Traugott & Alpers, supra note 38, at 925.
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involved. 209 Thus, the physician's first task is to provide the
adolescent patient, as he or she would any patient, with information
about his or her diagnosis, the nature of the recommended procedure
including the risks, and the prognosis if the procedure is performed as
well as other alternative medical treatments. 210
However, the
physician must simultaneously determine the "adolescent's decisionmaking capacity by determining whether he or she understands the
recommended therapy, the alternatives, the risks and the benefits, and
the likely consequences of refusal.",211 Based on the close relationship
with the adolescent patient and daily experience with adolescents with
same or similar conditions, the physician is the most qualified to
determine whether the minor is capable of making an informed and
competent decision.212 Should a dispute arise between the parents'
and the adolescent's choice of treatment, the physician should act as a
negotiator to facilitate a compromise. 2 13 In doing so, the physician
should use the same criteria to evaluate the parents' decision, and
assess the overall relationship between the adolescent and his or her
parents. 2 14 As a negotiator, the physician must listen to and
acknowledge the adolescent patient's concerns. 2 15 By carefully
listening to the adolescent patient's reasons for refusal or for choosing
one therapy over another, the physician will be better able to address
and alleviate the concerns, which may actually lead to the adolescent
accepting a beneficial treatment that he or she was originally
209 Id.
210 See Penkower, supra note 99, at 1170. See also supra notes 157-160
with accompanying text.
211 See Traugott & Alpers, supra note 38, at 925.
212 See Waters, supra note 78, at 113-14 (suggesting that "trained and

qualified medical professionals can best determine an individual minor's maturity and
best interests"). The United States Supreme Court has upheld medical-review procedures
in other areas. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979) (conditioning parental
decision to commit a child to a state's mental hospital on an independent review by the
state's hospital authorities).
213 See Traugott & Alpers, supra note 38, at 925.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 926.
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216

unwilling to undergo.
When the conflict is severe, hospital ethics committees can
assist in this process. 2 17 All hospitals are required by the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations to
implement process for resolving patient care disputes. 2 18 It is
suggested that such committees include an expert in adolescent
medicine, such as an adolescent psychiatrist or psychologist, and if a
non-Western culture is involved, a representative of that
community. 2 19 If the dispute can be resolved at this level, child
welfare officials or courts will not need to become involved.22 °
As discussed above, the best interests of the adolescent patient
will control, however, non-medical factors may be as important as
medical factors in determining what is the best interest of the
adolescent patient, especially if the adolescent places great weight on
them. 22 1 Thus, the physician should consider the quality of life as
well as the duration of life when determining what is in the adolescent
222
patient's best interest.
The cultural perspective of the patient and his or her family is
also a crucial factor that must be considered. 223 The Lor case 224
216 Id. Adolescents tend to be particularly concerned with peer acceptance.
Id. For instance, a refusal to undergo chemotherapy treatment, may be, in part, out of
concern for physical appearance at an important upcoming social occasion. Id.
217 See Traugott & Alpers, supra note 38, at 926.
218 Id

219 Id.; see also Rosato, supra note 41, at 13-14 (discussing how treatment
decisions "shape the definition of one's entire life").
220 Id.; see also Redding, supra note 34, at 739.

With respect to mental

health treatment Redding suggests that a clinician and attorney work as a team to
determine whether a minor is capable of giving consent; the attorney guarding the legal
rights of the child and the clinician assessing the child's ability to consent. Id. This
system may also work in other medical situations, although it may be more cumbersome
than necessary. Id. at 739-40
221 See Traugott & Alpers, supra note 38, at 926.
222 Id. See also supra note 208 and accompanying text.
223 See Traugott & Alpers, supra note 38, at 925.
224 See sources cited supra note 149 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Lor case.
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illustrates how non-Western cultures may have different views about
the adolescent's best interest. 22 5 In cases such as this one, the
physician should consider whether the adolescent embraces the values
of his or her culture and whether non-Western treatment may be a
viable alternative. 226 Above all, the physician should maintain a sense
of neutrality, by not imposing his or her beliefs and value system on
the adolescent
and, instead, should respect the views of the informed
22 7
adolescent.

B. The Court's Role

Involvement of the court in the treatment decision may only
further exacerbate the situation between the adolescent, family, and
physicians. However, until adolescents in all jurisdictions are afforded
the constitutional right to give informed consent, and even once this
right is granted, it may, at times be necessary to resort to litigation and
involve judges in the decision-making process. 22 8 When agreement
cannot be reached regarding an adolescent's medical treatment, either
the physician, hospital, or state may request the court to authorize
treatment, or empower
a third party with the right to consent on behalf
22 9
of the patient.
When deciding who gets to choose the course of medical
treatment, the judge "should not assume that a broad parental
autonomy right dictates the outcome." 230 Instead, the judge should
focus on the best interests of the adolescent patient, granting more
weight to the adolescent's wishes, while not ignoring the positions of
the physicians, the state, and the parents.
In fact, many, if not all,
225 See Traugott & Alpers, supra note 38, at 925.
226Id .

Id.
228 Id. at 926.
229 Id

230 See Sher, supra note 35, at 184.
231 See Traugott & Alpers, supra note 38, at 926; see also Rosato, supra note
41, at 50 (arguing the "judge's initial and most important determination will be whether
the minor demonstrated his maturity by clear and convincing evidence").
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of the factors the physician needs to assess in determining the
to consent should also be considered and
adolescent patient's ability
232
weighed by the judge.
In evaluating a case, the courts should utilize experts in
adolescent medicine in order to obtain a reliable understanding of the
particularities of the adolescent's case. 233 These experts should
interview the patient and offer testimony both about the decisionmaking capabilities of the typical adolescent and this particular
individual.. If based on all of the testimony, the court concludes
that the adolescent is capable of making an informed decision, the
adolescent's choice should be respected.. If the adolescent is not
capable of making such a decision, the alternative would be to
treatment option would be in the adolescent patient's
determine which
236
interest.
best
The judicial bypass procedure authorized in Bellotti2 37 is an
alternative method which allow adolescents to seek the medical
treatment they desire. 238 In a judicial bypass hearing the judge would
determine if the minor has the maturity and capability to consent to
treatment. 239 This type of legal proceeding most likely would occur if
the parents and adolescent were in conflict as to the preferred course
232See supra Part V.A. Professor Rosato also argues that a state's interest
should only prevail if "treatment is nonexperimental and when a significant probability
exists that the condition or disease will be cured or that the major symptoms of the
condition will be alleviated in the foreseeable future." See Rosato, supra note 41, at 50,
68-69, & 83-87. This argument would result, for example, in court ordered blood
transfusion of a Jehovah's Witness if such treatment would save his or her life. Similarly,
the court would have been forced to reach a different conclusion in the Swan case. See
discussion supra notes 131-137 and accompanying text. See also Rosato, supra note 41,
at 87-94.
233 See Traugott & Alpers, supra note 38, at 926.
234 Id.
235 ld.
236

Id.

237 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979); see also supra note 93
and accompanying text.
238 See Traugott & Alpers, supra note 38, at 926-27.
239 Id. at 927.
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of treatment and neither the hospital nor state intervened first.24 0 Such
a mechanism would place the burden on the adolescent patient to take
legal action in order to have his or her choice considered. 241 In cases
where the adolescent is seriously ill this may be a very difficult, if not
impractical, option.242 Thus, a more practical approach would be to
allow the physician to assess the adolescent's decision-making
and only resort to a court procedure in
capacity, as discussed above,
24 3
cases.
extreme
the most
CONCLUSION

The exceptions that the Supreme Court and legislatures have
made with regard to an adolescent's ability to consent to medical
treatment are inconsistent with the traditional legal doctrine that a
minor is incapable of giving consent. However, research has shown
that adolescents are in fact as capable of making complex decisions as
adults. 244 In light of this fact, the law should give way to the trend
established in the areas of emancipation and abortion and embrace the
mature minor doctrine.
Under the current scheme, a presumably immature minor may
still obtain an abortion. Furthermore, if the minor opts to have the
child, she has legal authority to make medical decisions for the child,
regardless of the fact that she is prohibited from making any medical
treatment choices for herself. In contrast, a mature adolescent, who
has dealt with the complexities of an incurable illness, does not have a
legal voice in deciding treatment. In addition, the inconsistencies that
exist make it extremely difficult to know whether a court will
intervene and to what extent. 245 What has happened is the legislature
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id.

243See Traugott & Alpers, supra note 38, at 927.
244 See Redding, supra note 34, at 707-09.
245 See Sher, supra note 35, at 159.
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and courts have reacted to specific teen "crises," such as pregnancy
and sexually transmitted disease, and have not actually carved out
these consent exceptions because they believe minor's have a right to
privacy or self-determination. 46
These inconsistencies make it clear that there is a need to
reevaluate whether adolescents should be allowed to consent to
medical care. Based on the Supreme Court's declaration that minors
have constitutional rights, including the right to privacy,247 and minors
ability to make complex decisions a rebuttable presumption of
competency should be granted to adolescents. This presumption of
capacity should only be challenged if there is strong evidence that the
adolescent is actually incompetent to make such important decisions.
The adolescent's physician should play the paramount role in
assessing the adolescent's decision-making ability. Where conflict
arises that the physician is incapable of resolving through negotiation
with the adolescent and the adolescent's parents, a hospital ethics
committee would be the next appropriate dispute resolution method.
The courts should only be used as a last resort in resolving conflict.
The few states that have recognized the mature minor doctrine have
realized that age is an arbitrary method of determining capacity. It is
time that the rest of the legal community also acknowledge this
obvious principle.
By creating this rebuttable presumption
adolescents will finally enjoy their rights of informed consent, bodily
integrity, self-determination, and privacy to the fullest extent.
ChristineM Hanisco

246 See Walter J. Wadlington, Consent to Medical Care for Minors, in
CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 57, 73 (Gary B. Melton et. al. eds., 1983); see also

Rosato, supra note 41, at 29.
247 See discussion supra notes 73-99 and accompanying text.

